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Timely Interventions: Temporality and Peacebuilding 
 
Abstract 
While there has been a long engagement with the impact of time on peacebuilding 
policies and practice, this engagement has to date focused predominately on issues of 
short- versus long-term initiatives, and of waning donor support for such initiatives. 
More recently, the critical peacebuilding turn has focused attention on the politics of the 
everyday as being essential to emancipatory endeavours enacted through localisation. 
Yet despite this, time itself has not been the subject of analysis, and the politics of time 
have not been integrated into the study of peacebuilding. This article, drawing both on 
historical institutionalist and on critical international studies analyses of temporality, 
provides a framework for analysing the impacts of time on the potential to achieve 
emancipatory peace. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Cambodia, this article asserts that a focus on Policy Time, Liberal Political Time and 
Intergenerational Time highlights how peacebuilding initiatives are framed by disparate 
timescapes that limit the visibility of local chronopolitics, and that this in turn restricts 
local empowerment and resistances. 
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It is well understood that the pursuit of peace takes time and requires good timing (the 
implementation of the right policies at the right time), and the tensions between the 
short-termism of policy mandates and the long-term needs of communities are also well 
recognised. Despite this, the direct engagement with the conceptualisation and 
enactment of time has been remarkably absent from the study of peacebuilding. This is 
particularly striking when we turn to the critical peacebuilding literatures, which have 
sought to foreground emancipation through the privileging of the local and the politics 
of the everyday. While the shift away from state-centric approaches to peacebuilding, 
underway since the mid-1990s, has been embraced by both academic and policy 
communities, we are concerned with the second generation of localisation scholarship, 
which understands localisation not simply as a tool of peacebuilding, but as fundamental 
to an emancipatory peace. In this context, the emphasis on local agency is crucial to 
resistance.1 Implicit within this framing is a recognition that the lived experiences of 
individuals and communities are distinct from those of states and elites. However, this 
emphasis on localisation has been the subject of significant critique. 
A central concern is that the local turn may serve to erase difference by obscuring the 
internal power dynamics of communities, and by potentially romanticising the local, 
reproducing old colonial tropes. This has been recognised by the proponents of critical 
peacebuilding who call for emancipatory politics that move beyond rhetoric and 
ethnocentric arguments. This requires that we take local complexities to heart through 
a deep engagement ‘with the local context, culture, history, needs as well as rights and 
institutions’.2 In order for us to be able to successfully rise to this challenge, it is essential 
that we recognise that time is fundamental, particularly in terms of how it is tied into 
power dynamics through the ability of statist and Western timescapes to regulate what 
is seen as possible and correct. However, in doing so, it is also vital for us to highlight 
how alternative understandings of time can shape local expectations and forms of 
resistance. By emphasising chronopolitics, the politics of time and how time is prefigured 
in politics, we are able to better appreciate how differing timescapes both structure and 
 
1 Thania Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda 
for future research’, Third World Quarterly, 36:5 (2015), pp. 857-74. 
2 Oliver Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday 
as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3:3 
(2009), pp. 324-44: p. 335. 
delimit localisation, and crucially how the variability of local timescapes provides a more 
complex understanding of the local everyday which in turn is essential to emancipatory 
peacebuilding. 
Over the course of a range of fieldwork interviews conducted between 2016 and 2018 in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)3 and Cambodia, on the topic of local empowerment in 
peacebuilding, interviewees consistently raised the thematics of timeframes, timelines, 
long-term investment and intergenerational peace. In each instance these were noted 
as barriers to the enactment of local ownership and the achievement of a sustainable 
peace for communities. This emphasises the importance of the issue of temporality to 
the conduct of peace, particularly in relation to bottom-up processes that prioritise 
community engagement as a prerequisite for the successful establishment of an 
emancipatory peace. 
This article, drawing on historical institutional4 and critical international relations5 
literatures on time, provides a framework to understand how three distinct timescapes 
 
3 Also referred to as ‘Bosnia’ within some interview transcripts. 
4 Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations’, International Organization, 65:2 
(2011), pp. 367-99; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
5 Kimberley Hutchings, ‘Happy Anniversary! Time and critique in International Relations theory’, Review of 
International Studies, 33:S1 (2007), pp. 1-89; Kimberley Hutchings, ‘Time and the Study of World Politics’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 46:3 (2018), pp. 253-8; Cheryl Lousley, ’Humanitarian 
Melodramas, Globalist Nostalgia: Affective Temporalities of Globalization and Uneven 
impact on the pursuit of emancipatory peacebuilding conducted by civil society actors.6 
The first, which we label ‘Policy Time’, focuses on how the institutionalisation of 
particular timescapes shapes donor practices, framing the time horizon of peacebuilding 
activities. The disjuncture between the timescapes of donors and those of local 
communities severely restricts local emancipatory practices. The second, ‘Liberal 
Political Time’, relates to the manner in which peace agreements and peacebuilding 
policies are informed and limited by temporal logics. This timescape will be shown to 
privilege the narratives of elites at the expense of local communities’ experiences, 
through the privileging of linear statist time. The final category, ‘Intergenerational Time’, 
relates to the occlusion within peace initiatives of how the unfolding of time can lead to 
new problems between generations, and distinct peacebuilding needs. Through the 
privileging of the experience of time, and of the dominant narratives of past conflicts, 
peacebuilding initiatives may serve to erase generational differences and distinct politics 
of the everyday. 
 
Development’, Globalizations, 13:3 (2016), pp. 310-28; Michael J. Shapiro, ‘National Times and Other 
Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship’, Cultural Studies, 14:1 (2000), pp. 79-98. 
6 This article’s focus on local ownership in peacebuilding is embedded within the critical peacebuilding 
turn’s emphasis on mechanisms of local empowerment and emancipation. See: Roger Mac Ginty and 
Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A critical agenda for peace’, Third World Quarterly, 
34:5 (2013), pp. 763-83; Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal 
Peacebuilding’, International Journal, 62:3 (2007), pp. 459-78. 
This article makes three distinct contributions to ongoing debates about peacebuilding. 
In the first instance, we advance a novel approach to establish how we can integrate 
thinking about temporality into the discourse and practice of emancipatory peace. 
Secondly, we assert that a sophisticated understanding of the local and everyday politics 
demands that we foreground chronopolitics, and that this is a crucial component both 
of local resistances and of impediments to emancipatory aims. Finally, we provide 
empirical contributions to literatures on peacebuilding in BiH and Cambodia. 
This article focuses narrowly on how time impacts on formal civil society organisations, 
and specifically on non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as a mechanism of local 
empowerment.7 This is not however to claim that NGOs are, or should be, the main 
actors in emancipatory peacebuilding endeavours.8 The article first provides an overview 
of how temporality is being framed as a means of analysing peacebuilding. The article 
then turns to a brief overview of how time is currently incorporated into peacebuilding 
theory and practice, focusing first on liberal frameworks, and then on the emancipatory 
endeavours of critical peacebuilding. This provides the basis for the subsequent 
empirical discussion of three timescapes within the cases of BiH and Cambodia. The 
 
7 This article is based on a study on local capacity building through NGOs. 
8 Any drive to establishing an emancipatory and sustainable peace must confront the complexities of the 
role of the West in such endeavours and navigate the complexities of how to facilitate local agency 
without simultaneously dictating the terms of peace. For an overview of the issues see: Mac Ginty and 
Richmond (2013). 
article then concludes with a brief discussion of the impacts of this analysis and identifies 
potential new avenues of research. 
 
The Temporal Turn 
Time has been a central concern within international relations. Wrapped up in 
discussions of progress, of human nature, and historical structures, notions of time are 
at the heart of political analysis. This, however, has manifested primarily as a concern 
with history, where scholars have paid attention to the question of whether the past is 
a viable source of understanding for the present. As Christopher McIntosh illustrates,9 
while history is rife within the study of international relations, the notion that time might 
be an independent object of analysis is largely absent. “Equally important, they leave the 
dominant representation of time unquestioned, as well as the epistemological values 
based upon that representation”, as Simon Bulmer puts it.10 This is beginning to be 
redressed through the broad temporal turn in political analysis.  
 
9 Simon Bulmer, ‘Politics in Time meets the politics of time: historical institutionalism and the EU 
timescape’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:2 (2009), pp. 307-24; Christopher McIntosh, ‘Theory 
across time: The privileging of time-less theory in international relations’, International Theory, 7:3 (2015), 
pp. 464-500. 
10 McIntosh (2015), p. 465. 
While assessing the breadth of emerging work on temporality is beyond the scope of this 
article, there are two dominant strands of analysis that inform this study. We have on 
the one hand the historical institutionalist literatures focusing on process,11 which are 
broadly constrained to comparative politics and which have largely but not exclusively 
focused to date on the European Union.12 The other dominant approach is found within 
critiques of international relations, which have been led by a broad grouping of scholars 
that have drawn variously on post-colonial13 and post-structural analyses.14 The critical 
scholarship is interested in how temporality is constitutive of politics and the dynamics 
of power. Far from working at cross-purposes, these approaches in combination 
highlight how chronopolitics have structured peacebuilding policies, often to the 
detriment of critical emancipatory goals. Crucially, a foregrounding of chronopolitics can 
facilitate emancipatory endeavours by emphasising the local complexities of peoples and 
their communities, and how varying timescapes shape experiences and expectations, as 
well as framing their resistances to power imbalances. 
 
11 Pierson (2004). 
12 Klaus H. Goetz and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, ‘Political time in the EU: dimensions, perspectives, 
theories’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:2 (2009), pp. 180-201. 
13 For example: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
14 Shapiro (2000). 
The process and historical analysis literatures have been interested in a broad range of 
issues which start from the basic premise that the passage of time is fundamental to 
understanding politics. This analysis is, according to Paul Pierson: 
…historical because it recognizes that political development must be 
understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is institutionalist because 
it stresses that many of the contemporary political implications of these 
temporal processes are embedded in institutions—whether formal rules, 
policy structures, or norms.15  
There is thus a focus on the revelation of ‘timescapes’, which sociologist Barbara Adam 
defines as “a cluster of temporal features, each implicated in all the others, but not of 
equal importance in each instance”.16 The range of issues that can be analysed as 
temporal categories is extensive17, and includes such matters as temporal location (when 
something occurs), the ordering or sequencing of actions, the quickness of actions and 
effects, and how long things take to happen.18 The focus here, following Klaus Goetz and 
 
15 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science 
Review, 94:2 (2000), pp. 251-67: pp. 264-5. 
16 Barbara Adam, Time (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 143. 
17 Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2009). 
18 Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling and Klaus H. Goetz, ‘The EU timescape: from notion to research 
agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:2 (2009), pp. 325-36; Philippe C. Schmitter and Javier 
Santiso, ‘Three temporal dimensions of the consolidation of democracy’, International Political Science 
Review, 19:1 (1998), pp. 69-92. 
Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, is on the provision of coherent explanations of events, and on 
understanding how time impacts upon politics: 
Where aspects of time – be they terms, time budgets, time horizons, time 
rules in decision-making or temporal properties of policy – are used to 
explain something else, their effects can often only be detected through 
observation over longer periods of time.19 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling further point out that historical institutional studies into time 
tend to distinguish between “polity, politics and policy dimensions”.20 In this division, 
‘polity’ relates to the mechanisms of governance, including such issues as how 
government terms, budgets, and planning horizons shape and are shaped by the passage 
of time. The politics component relates to how time is a resource and a constraint on 
decision-making, where the literature focuses in particular on legislation. Such 
literatures use political time as: 
a convenient shorthand for a very diverse range of rules, norms, conventions and 
understandings that relate to time as a resource and constraint for political 
 
19 Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2009), p. 182. 
20 Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2009), p. 184. 
institutions and actors; in political decision-making; and in the structuring of 
public policies.21 
The third category, which is policy time, pertains to the effects of time on the design, 
implementation, and impact of public policy. 
To date, the abovementioned literature has focused extensively on internal processes, 
exploring the temporal components on the European Union, for example, and how they 
shape dynamics and outcomes within the institution and its member states. The 
literature has not explored temporality and processes on international policies external 
to the organisations. Secondly, the focus has been on democracies, with little attention 
being paid to the dynamics of time on democratising or authoritarian states.  
Drawing on the analysis of the interviews with Bosnian and Cambodian NGO 
representatives, the first dominant narrative of how timescapes impede the 
establishment of a sustainable peace is consistent with the historical institutionalist 
account. The first timescape, which we label Policy Time, emphasises how peacebuilding 
practices are regulated and limited due to the bureaucratic clock-time, shaping project 
budgets, time horizons, and time rules in the design and implementation of 
peacebuilding policies and practices. As will be discussed in greater detail, this presents 
 
21 Meyer-Sahling and Goetz (2009), p. 328. 
significant impediments to emancipatory aims by enforcing timeframes that are 
disconnected from the everyday experiences of communities.  
In contrast to the temporal analysis focusing on processes and outcomes, the critical 
analysis project is a fundamentally normative engagement where the analysis of time is 
mobilised, according to Andrew Hom, “as a means of destabilising hegemonic 
foundations – the international system, the logics of modernity, rationalist social science, 
to name a few”.22 The works within this school of thought share an interest in 
understanding how time constitutes the international system, and how it serves to 
(re)produce relations of power.23 For Kimberley Hutchings,24 the temporal turn provides 
a crucial mechanism to understand and critique assumptions of a singular unified 
temporality, emphasising the impacts of statist time or ‘clock-time’ which presume a 
linear, unidirectional flow that is independent of human experience. Sitting alongside 
this analysis are approaches embedded within post-colonial analysis that highlight how 
“chronopolitical” narratives of universal progress serve to justify and reproduce relations 
of power, stressing tropes such as “left behind”.25 This linkage of time with progress is 
 
22 Andrew R. Hom, ‘Silent Order: the Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations’, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies, 46:3 (2018a), pp. 303-30: p. 306. 
23 Hom (2018a). 
24 Kimberley Hutchings, Time and World Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); 
Hutchings (2018). 
25 Lousley (2016), pp. 312-13; see also Chakrabarty (2009), pp. 6-8. 
clearly embedded within a Western narrative of economic and political development, 
and is starkest in Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis.26 
This provides the conceptual grounding for the second dominant narrative timescape 
that arose in the interviews, which we label Liberal Political Time. This Western statist 
time assumes a particular linear history that fundamentally shapes the interpretation of 
politics, the framing of what is politically possible, and privileges particular agents’ time 
subjectivities over others. This emphasises the ways in which Western liberal norms and 
understandings about peacebuilding and democratisation serve to structure 
peacebuilding policies.  
Following the critical temporal turn, particularly as advanced by Tarja Väyrynen,27 we 
assert that the Liberal Political Time is central to the identity construction of post-conflict 
states, and that peacebuilding practices serve to (re)enforce specific articulations of 
time, in particular linearity, that shape nations’ constructions and (re)productions. 
Väyrynen emphasises the ways in which post-war states often seek to construct a 
“[n]ational history [that] works to secure for a contingent nation the false unity of the 
national subject evolving through time”.28 Here, Väyrynen uses temporality to highlight 
 
26 Lousley (2016), p. 313. 
27 Tarja Väyrynen, ‘Rethinking national temporal orders: The subaltern presence and enactment of the 
political’, Review of International Studies, 42:4 (2016), pp. 597-612.  
28 Väyrynen (2016), p. 602. 
the ways in which memory construction needs to be continually rearticulated to defend 
an artificial linear national past. “In short, creating a symbolic grammar for war and 
violence and writing postwar history is as much about forgetting as it is about 
remembering”, Väyrynen concludes.29 While working from a different theoretical 
framework, over 40 years ago Marvin Soros emphasised how temporality is a crucial 
framework within which experiences of violence are understood and articulated.30 In 
discussing the importance of understanding generational time in relation to peace, 
Soroos distinguished between the needs of intragenerational peace and 
intergenerational peace where the latter relates to the connections “between parents 
and children or between parents and grandchildren”.31 Peace research “has focused 
almost exclusively upon intragenerational, latitudinal… types of relationships”.32 His 
analysis of why scholarship has not engaged with intergenerational peace remains 
pertinent today: 
First, until recently, there has been a prevailing assumption that human 
progress was inevitable and that each generation left an enriched legacy for 
future generations… Second, research and education have been oriented 
 
29 Väyrynen (2016), p. 604. 
30 Marvin S. Soroos, ‘Adding an Intergenerational Dimension to Conceptions of Peace’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 13:3 (1976), pp. 173-83. 
31 Soroos (1976), p. 173. 
32 Soroos (1976), p. 175. 
almost exclusively toward describing and explaining the past, thereby failing 
to foster future consciousness. Thus, there has been little general concern 
for, and even awareness of, the ways in which decisions made at one point 
in time affect the options available to others in the more distant future.33 
While firmly rooted within problem solving, the resonance of the concept of 
intergenerational peace with later critical scholarship on identity formation, power, and 
coloniality is stark. Following from the interview data, we have adopted 
Intergenerational Time as the third timescape affecting localisation in peacebuilding. 
Focusing on intergenerational time attunes the study of peacebuilding to how it is not 
simply a question of how different generations may have distinct needs, but how 
temporality is crucial to framing past and future events, potentially opening-up the 
possibility that addressing the expressed needs of one generation may not serve the 
goals of emancipatory peacebuilding for others. It further highlights the ways in which 
narratives of the ‘everyday’, which are treated as crucial to emancipatory endeavours, 
need to more clearly appreciate that the everyday is a timescape of its own which varies 
substantially from one community to the next. Furthermore, by running up against Policy 
and Liberal Political timescapes, this is indicative of the ways in which distinct systems of 
 
33 Soroos (1976), p. 178. 
meanings operate within a particular state, but where those of the state and 
international actors are privileged. 
This brief overview of the temporal turn in politics and international relations has 
provided three avenues for the examination of the effectiveness of the pursuit of 
localisation as a central mechanism of a sustainable, emancipatory peace. These are 
Policy Time, Liberal Political Time, and Intergenerational Time, each of which help us 
to focus on how the perception and experience of time can open-up different needs and 
expectations with respect to peacebuilding. An appreciation of time is crucial to the 
success of broader emancipatory projects. In keeping with critical scholarship, the shift 
to the local as the means of emancipation requires a sophisticated understanding of 
what constitutes the local (and crucially, what constitutes the local in a way that rejects 
a universalist tendency). Pierson notes that a failure to be attenuated to the slow 
unfolding of time can result in analysts ignoring the role of sociological variables. As 
such, a refusal to foreground temporality may obscure “important questions of politics 
because the relevant outcomes happen too slowly and are therefore simply off their 
radar screens”.34 More importantly, following the critical literatures, chronopolitics 
shapes how time is used both to preserve, but also to challenge systems of order.35 By 
 
34 Pierson (2004), p. 14. 
35 Ian Klinke, ‘Chronopolitics: A conceptual matrix’, Progress in Human Geography, 37:5 (2012), pp. 673-
90: p. 685. 
foregrounding temporality, it is possible to “recover political possibility from sovereign 
historical logics”.36 Hom, building on the work of Hutchings37 and of Tom Lundborg,38 
states that this “direct[s] attention away from hegemonic statist times toward the 
marginalized, oppressed, and otherwise forgotten times of global politics”.39 A focus on 
time thus provides crucial depth to the understandings of forms of existence and 
pockets of resistance, but also of the ways in which the formulation and enactment of 
chronopolitics can limit and foreclose these resistances. 
We are not seeking to foreclose the ways in which an examination of chronopolitics can 
provide important insights into peacebuilding but have rather used these as a means of 
making sense of apparent failings in achieving meaningful localisation in peacebuilding 
through the privileging of the everyday. 
 
Peacebuilding and Time 
Far from being absent from peacebuilding, time is woven into the very fabric of 
peacebuilding practice, though its presence has been remarkably under-explored. The 
 
36 Andrew R. Hom, ‘Timing is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International 
Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, 62:1 (2018b), pp. 69-79: p. 70. 
37 Hutchings (2008). 
38 Tom Lundborg, Politics of the Event: Time, movement, becoming (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
39 Hom (2018b), p. 70. 
first way in which time is integrated into the peacebuilding literature is through the 
articulation of peacebuilding as a process rather than an endpoint. Peacebuilding as a 
process accounts for time by seeing its unfolding as a progression of events, as the result 
of ‘dynamic processes’ that unfold over time.40 Thus, peacebuilding is not so much a fixed 
state or set of targets to be achieved in the sense that one might claim that they are 
‘building peace’. Rather, it is a process that, in any given environment, takes place over 
a time period characterised by significant international investment. Time is thus 
important in this respect as the field within which the events unfold, but the ways in 
which time itself shapes politics is largely occluded. While the articulation of 
peacebuilding as a process highlights how practices must be ongoing and responsive to 
changing circumstances, there is scant engagement with how time shapes the processes 
themselves as well as their outcomes. This builds upon the observation that even 
scholarship that is interested in sequencing or norm transmission rarely explicitly 
engages with temporal dynamics in a direct fashion.41  
The second manner in which time is expressed as a concern is articulated along the lines 
of short-term versus long-term peacebuilding. There is widespread understanding that a 
long-term approach to peacebuilding is necessary if efforts are to be successful and the 
 
40 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p. 27. 
41 McIntosh (2015), p. 475. 
peace is to be sustainable.42 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme emphasise the 
importance of understanding its long-term nature, stating that “peace requires social 
transformation and must be done slowly”.43 Yet, the continued prevalence of short-
termism in peacebuilding practice mitigates against the adoption of long-term policies. 
This, Timothy Donais argues, inhibits the chances of a locally-owned, long-term peace.44 
The result is that there is far more institutional knowledge available about how to build 
peace through short-term initiatives, for the short-term, and much less on longer-term 
approaches.45 And there is a genuine tension between these two imperatives: between 
short-term results on the one hand and long-term sustainability on the other.46 However, 
such formulations, while highlighting the indeterminate nature of peacebuilding, and 
how it should be seen as a series of events rather than a specific goal, do not pay 
 
42 Cedric de Coning, ‘Adaptive peacebuilding’, International Affairs, 94:2 (2018), pp. 301-17. 
43 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, ‘From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding 
Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder’, Third World Quarterly, 20:1 (1999), pp. 13-26: 
p. 15. 
44 Timothy Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding Processes’, Peace & Change, 34:1 (2009), pp. 3-26: p. 9. 
45 Stephen J. Stedman, ‘Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence’, in John Darby and Roger Mac 
Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 147-58. 
46 Annika Björkdahl and Kristine Höglund, ‘Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global–local 
encounters’, Peacebuilding, 1:3 (2013), pp. 289-99; James K. Boyce, ‘Beyond Good Intentions: External 
Assistance and Peace Building’, in Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (eds.), Good Intentions: Pledges 
of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 367-82; A.B. Fetherston, 
‘Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding: A reconsideration of theoretical 
frameworks’, International Peacekeeping, 7:1 (2000), pp. 190-218. 
sufficient attention to how different conceptions and experiences of time are central to 
how peacebuilding is enacted, and its viability as an emancipatory process. 
Finally, critical peacebuilding studies have engaged with the problematic notion of 
progress that is deeply embedded within the practice of peacebuilding. From the outset, 
peacebuilding has historically been a liberal project, entailing both economic and 
democratic liberalism as core mechanisms to redress the causes of violent conflict.47 
Within this articulation, time is clearly present insofar as there is a clear teleological 
articulation of an ideal endpoint of the progress, as expressed within Fukuyama’s end of 
history thesis. This normative valuation of progress, defined with respect to the 
positionality of Western states, has been rightly shown to erase difference, and to 
(re)enforce power dynamics to the detriment of subaltern communities. However, the 
critiques of peacebuilding have tended to focus on the impacts of such narratives, 
focusing on their intersection with power rather than foregrounding how this liberal 
political time impacts upon, disciplines, and is resisted by communities.  
 
47 David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (London: Routledge, 
2010); Donais (2009), p. 7; John Heathershaw, ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of 
Peacebuilding Discourses’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36:3 (2008), pp. 597-621; Roland 
Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, 22:2 (1997), pp. 54-
89; Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 38:3 (2010), pp. 665-92; Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011). 
It is from the standpoint of critical peacebuilding that that we seek to understand the 
role of chronopolitics. The critical literatures on peacebuilding have sought to 
foreground emancipation, by defining “who peace is for, and what it means”.48 Following 
Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond (2016), we link emancipation with the need to 
look at the everyday nature of a sustainable peace, and the requirement for peace to be 
culturally relevant and centred around the everyday lived experiences of people. Mac 
Ginty and Richmond explain that, “[in] everyday terms, emancipation treads a fine line 
between respecting autonomy and difference and improving rights, needs, law and 
institutional frameworks for the organisation of politics (meaning the distribution of 
material resources).”49 This entails a move away from formal institution-building to focus 
more on the formal and informal societal dynamics of people’s everyday experiences.50 
 
48 Richmond (2009), p. 558. 
49 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: a 
reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping, 23:2 (2016), pp. 219-39: p. 
229. 
50 See David Chandler, ‘Beyond neoliberalism: resilience, the new art of governing complexity’, 
Resilience, 2:1 (2014), pp. 47-63; David Chandler, ‘Resilience and the ‘everyday’: beyond the paradox of 
‘liberal peace’’, Review of International Studies, 41:1 (2015), pp. 27-48; Cedric de Coning, ‘From 
peacebuilding to sustaining peace: Implications of complexity for resilience and sustainability’, 
Resilience, 4:3 (2016), pp. 166-81; European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe 
– A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy’, European Union Global 
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It is within the broad set of commitments set out above that we have chosen to examine 
the processes of localisation as a core mechanism of an emancipatory peace. While 
noting Mark Duffield’s critique that this shift to the local can be understood as a shifting 
of blame onto the subaltern,51 we nevertheless consider the shift to be crucial to 
empowering communities and marginalised groups and redressing their needs. 
As with the liberal literatures, the critical engagements with peacebuilding do talk about 
time, and recognise that its passage is vital in both shaping and understanding social 
practices. The notion of the everyday suggests a different temporal rhythm to other 
articulations that focus on grand progress – rather, by treating the repetitive processes 
of life as a location of politics, one can highlight sites of politics. In this way, emphasising 
different temporalities is potentially ‘politicising’ as it serves, per Hom’s line of 
argumentation,52 to disrupt hegemonic discourses of time that serve to shape policy, to 
silence communities, and to limit possibilities for peacebuilding.  
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Methods 
This article embraces a mixed methods approach, drawing on 37 formal interviews (using 
open and closed questions) conducted in BiH and Cambodia in 2016 and 2017 (see Annex 
for the list of interviews). The questions included in the qualitative interviews were 
developed following an extensive review of the extant literatures on localisation and 
peacebuilding and were designed to identify how localisation was understood in 
particular circumstances, and what were perceived as conceptual and practical barriers 
to its success in promoting peacebuilding. These involved open-ended questions and the 
conversations with the interviewees were in part led by the responses. The authors both 
have experience in researching peace processes in the given countries, and substantial 
ties into their respective NGO communities. The interviewees were all involved, in one 
way or another, in peacebuilding, and included representatives of local and international 
NGOs, think tanks, donor organisations, the EU and other international institutions, as 
well as academics and embassy personnel. All interviews were recorded by being 
written-down in note-form and/or audio recorded, then were subsequently transcribed 
in full by the authors. 
The topic of time was an indirect line of questioning during the interviews, raised in 
relation to the sustainability of peacebuilding. This article has emerged as a result of an 
inductive process arising from the common issues of time that were mentioned by the 
interviewees. The discussion below follows from the coding of the transcribed interviews 
whereby three clusters of common discourses related to timescapes were identified. 
Conceptual literatures were then used to make sense of these narratives. It is important 
to note that we were focused predominantly on the narratives of effectiveness and 
limitations of localisation practices provided by civil society and donor representatives 
(see Annex), and it is within this context that discourses of time emerged. What this 
largely occludes is the array of local conceptions of temporality. 
 
Policy Time and Peacebuilding 
As stated, Policy Time emphasises the ways in which the timeframes that are assumed 
and applied in state policy decisions privilege the needs of bureaucracies, which in turn 
structures and limits the pursuit of local peacebuilding initiatives. As such, Policy Time is 
regulative, framing and reproducing power relations between donors, states, civil society 
actors and communities. The most common concern raised by the representatives of 
NGOs in BiH and Cambodia with respect to the topic of time related to the impact of 
changing funding priorities and structures. As was noted above, this is a point that has 
long been recognised in both academic and policy circles. The concern here is not related 
to the specific policies per se, or to the contention that a long-term approach is superior. 
Rather, more crucially our concern is over the fact that the imposition of the statist Policy 
Time enforces Western chronopolitics, that is statist time, that in turn forces narratives 
of conflicts, and policies for their resolution, to fit within the bureaucratic timeframes. 
This erases the complexities of local contexts. In particular, interviewees pointed to the 
interconnected ways in which funders’ Policy Time shapes peacebuilding initiatives and 
occludes other temporalities, which then negatively impacts on the viability of 
localisation of peacebuilding, as it (re)produces divisions between the interests of 
donors, the resultant actions of civil society actors, and the everyday timescapes of 
communities. 
While the funding format of donors, limited to relatively short-term projects, is 
understandable as it provides a means for states to reorient their policies and to provide 
oversight of funding, it nevertheless locks organisations into short-term planning cycles 
generally not lasting for more than four years.53 And in BiH, some funding for 
peacebuilding was limited to a maximum project lifespan of a single year.54 The short-
termism of donors is also evident in an apparent lack of interest in the potential follow-
on work from projects, and whether they are able to have a sustainable impact. This was 
noted by one Cambodian interviewee who stated that the donors’ focus on the narrow 
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remit of a project’s lifespan means that once a programme of funded work is completed, 
donors no longer pay any attention to the project or the organisation. This results in a 
perception that donors “don’t have a long-term commitment to strengthen the capacity 
of local actors. [NGOs] often fail after the short-term funding ends”.55 This runs counter 
to the explicit logic of localised peacebuilding which is based in large part on the 
presence of a robust civil society. This was also explicitly stated by interviewees in BiH, 
who emphasised the restrictiveness of the timeframes set by donors, who gave 
preference to programmes promising quick but potentially unsustainable or misleading 
results, and who were unwilling to fund multi-year programmes.56 
So basically, this is the problem: if you have one-year projects, you can’t do 
anything strategically. A one-year project is just for that year, and all of the 
donors are looking for really big impact. And that’s okay, but you can’t have 
strategic impact with a one-year project.57 
The second constraint arising from donor processes is that programmes are in large part 
‘locked-in’ at the outset of a project. The establishment of an agreed programme of 
work, with clearly articulated deliverables and milestones, mitigates the prospects of 
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projects being altered during their lifespan. Organisations are unable to respond to 
changing dynamics on the ground to alter their target communities, the broad 
mechanisms that are used to achieve stated aims, or for that matter to shape the 
endpoint to reflect the changes in the broader socio-political environment. In short, the 
passage of time is only relevant to the donors insofar as projects are expected to unfold 
as anticipated; how the flow of time can bring about unanticipated change is not 
thinkable while constrained by Policy Time. 
The third constraint to the long-term viability of NGOs engaged in peacebuilding 
activities, broadly conceived, is the intersection of an ongoing shift of funders’ priorities 
toward project funding, which is consistent with the broader policy timescape, with a 
movement away from the direct funding of civil society (USAID’s shift in this regard in 
Cambodia was noted as indicative of the broader sector). As one NGO representative 
stated: “[With] regard to the donors, I think that, yeah, the challenge is that they’re very 
project-based, they’re limited”.58 This shift towards the support of individual 
programmes of work is intended to ensure that development funds are able to reach the 
intended beneficiaries, but the impact on the civil society actors has been acute. During 
the interviews there was a continual refrain that the lack of overhead funding has put 
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the viability of organisations at risk over the long-term. The lack of support for the daily 
running of organisations has put significant pressures on their staff structures, forcing 
the downsizing of core staff, the loss of expertise in management and financial oversight, 
and the introduction of inefficiencies as NGOs are compelled to downscale and find small 
additional sources of funds to simply ‘keep the lights on’. Additionally, the constant 
pursuit of project funding has fostered an environment wherein organisations often 
dramatically shift their areas of work, moving away from erstwhile priorities related to 
peacebuilding in order to sustain their organisation. 
The final, and perhaps most critical, area in which donors are failing to engage with the 
issue of time and peacebuilding relates to the manner in which donors’ attention to 
peacebuilding erodes over time and shifts instead to other issue areas.59 As one 
international actor in BiH put it: “So, for us the biggest challenge was, like, working with 
these partners, convincing them that they should stick to these programmes, that in the 
long-term it will pay-off in regard [to] impact and in terms of being rewarded for their 
work”.60 One Cambodian interviewee asserted there is a lack of a long-term outlook 
towards redressing conflict and building peace: “Peacebuilding is no longer sexy here, 
now, for donors. Some local NGOs are reframing what they do as a result [to acquire 
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funding for their activities]”.61 Another Cambodian interviewee was also explicit on this 
account, stating that continued funding for peacebuilding in places like Cambodia is 
crucial for a sustainable democracy, while noting that the changing donor priorities have 
eroded the local capacity to engage in peacebuilding.62 The Cambodian case is 
demonstrative of the way in which donors shift their attention away from conflict 
resolution relatively quickly after the cessation of violence, and critically after the end of 
formal peace operations. 
While international funding continues following the end of violent conflict, donors 
rapidly shift to new priorities, focusing particularly on issues related to economic 
development in a broader sense. The result is that peacebuilding initiatives are 
effectively pushed aside in favour of other development priorities. Rather than this being 
the being the result of poor decision-making by donors, it highlights how policy 
timescapes regulate peacebuilding practice, breaking-up donor initiatives into discreet 
blocks of time, disconnected from the local chronopolitics. As such, the local experiences 
of time, which are discreet from donor timescapes and manifest in complex economic, 
social and political dynamics, are misread or ignored by donors, which in turn has the 
effect of silencing the needs of marginalised communities. This is in part resisted by local 
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civil society actors who opt to report on their activities in accordance with what was 
promised in their project proposals, but who pursue their chosen activities with an 
element of flexibility within the provided timeline. One NGO representative in BiH 
stated: “But none of these donors actually put, to be honest, any agenda or instructions 
that we have to follow during the implementation of these activities”.63 While the policy 
timescape is resisted, it nevertheless limits the activities aimed at local emancipatory 
endeavours, as the resistances themselves are forced into the requirements of donors. 
Clearly, many of the programmes that are funded by donors are intended to impact upon 
the broader political terrain, and to change existing dynamics, be they social, political or 
economic. Yet, the projects are treated by donors as if they are being implemented in an 
ahistorical space, where the potential for change in the broader environment is not 
effectively accounted for during the lifespans of individual projects. As a result of the 
policy timescape, the capacities of civil society actors to contribute to emancipatory 
peace initiatives are restricted. This is depoliticising and limits local capacities to shape 
and sustain any initiatives. It further detaches the operational timescape of 
peacebuilding activities from lived everyday timescapes, thus mitigating emancipatory 
goals. 
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 Liberal Political Time and Peacebuilding 
The second timescape derives from the liberal political project and its faith in linear 
progress, or Western liberal clock-time. As will be demonstrated, this temporality has 
profound effects on the design and implementation of local peacebuilding initiatives. 
The assumption of linearity leads to the presumption that, following a peace agreement, 
a given conflict is now ‘in the past’, that the gains obtained during that peace process 
will be maintained, and that further democratisation will subsequently be obtained. If 
these are not achieved promptly and in this order, the given state is described as 
backwards and primitive, and considered to be unwilling to accept progress. This is 
particularly evident in the ways in which donor investments in peacebuilding quickly 
wane as policymakers and politicians in funding states shift their attentions away from 
concerns over conflict and toward traditional development projects. What is effectively 
occluded in this is the possibility that, over the years following the cessation of formal 
peacebuilding initiatives, the environment conducive to a sustainable peace may erode, 
and the localisation of peacebuilding might not gain traction. This narrative of a linear 
past and present serves to reproduce narratives favourable to international and state 
authorities to the effect that conflicts are in the past, the effect of which is to overwrite 
and silence communities that may have very different everyday experiences.  
In both BiH and Cambodia, interviewees consistently decried the waning attention of 
donors to peacebuilding activities following democratic elections. While determining the 
precise extent of the shift of funding away from peace funding is difficult (DAC data for 
recipient states does not allow for this disaggregation), civil society representatives 
continually raised the erosion of funding for peace initiatives. While Policy Time shapes 
the delivery of programming, it is the Liberal Political Time that shapes the expectations 
of peace, frames how local dynamics are perceived, and how states enact authority. 
The dominant Liberal Political Time serves to force interpretations of events within post-
war states through a linear history that presumes the existence of pre- and post-peace 
moments. The complexities of the local political contexts, and changing political 
landscapes within the states, are thus largely erased, and the possibility of the 
synchronicity of time is dismissed. In practice, the focus of peacebuilding funding on 
transition periods, corresponding with formal peace missions, affords little appreciation 
to the long-term processes which can contribute to the erosion of political rights. More 
importantly, from a critical peacebuilding perspective, the statist clock-time subsumes 
communities, renders invisible the alternative perceptions of time with respect to 
violence and political relations, and erases or misrepresents local forms of resistance. 
These dynamics were clearly expressed within both BiH and Cambodia. 
On the surface there is significant evidence that Cambodia has been progressing in a 
manner consistent with Liberal Political Time. The war is consistently described as being 
‘in the past’, and its economic future is seen as promising. The state has avoided a slip 
back into civil war, has held numerous elections mostly labelled ‘free and fair’, and the 
state has sustained high levels of GDP growth over the past decade. However, these 
indicators of success obscure endemic problems within the country, particularly in 
relation to marginalised communities that have seen little if any substantive 
improvement in their quality of life, let alone in empowerment. The assumption of linear 
time thus obscures the operation of power, and the way in which elites can (re)entrench 
their authority is enabled in part by Liberal Political Time. Over the past five years there 
has been a steady erosion of the space for civil society, and relatively little progress on 
achieving a functional judiciary that operates independently of the interests of elites, or 
of a political environment were marginalised populations are able to effectively 
articulate their needs without fear of political reprisals. The situation in Cambodia today, 
over two decades following the end of the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia peacebuilding mission, is one where there is a growing concern amongst civil 
society actors over the closing-down of the political space.64 This has been undertaken 
in Cambodia in large part through quasi-legal processes where the state has passed 
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statutes that have been subsequently used to limit the power of civil society actors 
working narrowly on topics that may challenge the state. 
The adoption of an ‘NGO Law’ in Cambodia was singled-out by some civil society 
representatives as having a chilling effect. While legislation to govern the charity sector 
is to be expected in a fully functioning democracy, the manner in which the law has been 
designed and implemented is arguably orientated around asserting control and limiting 
critique, rather than ensuring transparency and guaranteeing that NGOs can effectively 
operate as charities for the good of the population. The government has shown an 
increasing willingness to use the courts to silence dissent. The media has likewise come 
under significant scrutiny by the state, with The Cambodia Daily, an English language 
news service that is widely considered to be critical of the government, having been shut 
down within Cambodia by the government in 2017. Moreover, the position of 
marginalised communities is particularly problematic in this regard. “With minority 
groups it is even more difficult as they have to register first as a minority community 
through the Ministry of Interior”, one interviewee explained.65 This was echoed by 
another interviewee who stated that it is now more difficult to support local groups (both 
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formal and informal). The government does not even want to support organisations 
doing social change work.66  
This use of the NGO Law arguably forms part of a broader drive to close-down political 
space in Cambodia, and to limit the ability of any potential opposition to the government 
to operate. The government has long been suspicious of the NGO sector in this regard, 
with Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly stating that there were two governments in 
Cambodia: the elected government and the NGO sector. One NGO representative stated 
that the government “always treat NGOs as being in favour of opposition parties. Our 
work with communities has been accused as counter-revolutionary. But we follow 
international human rights”.67 Another NGO representative stated that “Mostly (sic) 
importantly the government labels us as the opposition”.68 Other NGO representatives 
expressed serious concern over the shrinking of the political space, stating that alongside 
the NGO Law, the state appears to be monitoring organisations, which in turn constricts 
the ability of civil society to represent the needs of the population. “I assume that there 
is a government watch list, primarily because of our work in Prey Long, and because of 
our outspoken local partners”, one interviewee explained.69 An international NGO 
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representative further decried the shrinking of the political space, and the ability of civil 
society organisations to operate in Cambodia. The individual noted in particular the 
increased burden on organisations to acquire visas for international staff, and that there 
is more intense auditing of groups’ activities and outputs (such as publications). “This all 
serves to close-down civil society”, the individual concluded.70 
The pressure described above was noted by numerous NGO representatives working 
broadly on issues pertaining to human rights, indigenous communities, forestry issues 
and land rights, all of which potentially challenge the entrenched interests of elites 
within the state. In discussing the barriers put in place by the government, a local NGO 
representative stated that local authorities would come to their organisation’s offices 
and observe meetings, and that Ministry of Interior officials would attend public fora and 
take notes. What went unstated in this response, but was implied, was that such 
activities were intimidating. “Even Tuol Sleng prevents us from having meetings when 
we talk about history”, the individual said.71 This all effectively limits the ability of civil 
society organisations to work with local communities, to articulate their interests and to 
redress sources of conflict at the local level. As such, the chances of successfully 
achieving the goal of a sustainable peace, underpinned by a localisation of peacebuilding 
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practices through civil society actors, are being eroded over time. However, the ability 
of donors to pursue and adopt policies in relation to these dynamics is constrained by 
the broader liberal timescapes of the unfolding of democratisation and peacebuilding. 
This Liberal Political Time, by enforcing a linear tale of progress, erases the ongoing 
political dynamics, and demonstrates how time can be used by states as a means of 
reifying power over subaltern communities. 
The liberal timescape was similarly evident in BiH, where policies appeared to be driven 
by an assumption of a linear move of a state from warfighting, to post-war conditions, 
to the gradual concretisation of a liberal peace, resting upon a particular rendering of 
the conflict being as ‘in the past’, even if there is a concern that it might be returned to. 
This concern might seem at first paradoxical, but the post-war condition often has many, 
if not all, of the features of a pre-war environment. These include a poor economy, high 
levels of unemployment and poverty, corruption, discrimination and structural violence, 
and ethnically-defined nationalist politics, to name just some of the conditions. One 
interviewee explained: 
There are lots of local NGOs—victims’ associations, also. But they are mostly 
involved in instigating conflict, rather than conflict resolution. Their views 
are all, of course, one-sided, and they promote hatred and fear. In every way 
we are progress-dependent. And if you look at the conflict cycle, we have 
passed the post-conflict long ago and we’re well into the pre-conflict phase. 
So, I think it’s about time that the international community lifts up its head 
and engages with the big picture.72 
Rather than an outbreak of war, the primary concern was that the structural violence 
would worsen the prevailing negative peace.73 While donor organisations’ 
representatives did recognise this issue, the programmes funded by donor organisations 
were not actively working to counteract the cycles of hatred and fear articulated in the 
above interview. A foregrounding of liberal political time serves to highlight how the 
discourses and practices of donors occlude the fact that the passage of time does not 
immediately erase underlying drivers of conflict. 
Peacebuilding was viewed by locals and internationals alike as something that took place 
in a linear form, with the narrative of progress being raised in a number of interviews. 
The EU was the symbol of that development (with a linear path leading towards that 
aspiration): “we’ve been looking at the path that other EU members have gone through, 
and the pattern was generally security first and then development, in which NATO 
stands for security, and then the EU stands for development and progress”, a military 
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officer explained.74 This was also put across in terms of present BiH practices being 
dated: “The integrated border management strategy was out of date; it wasn’t 
compliant with EU and international best practice”, one EU actor said.75 Meanwhile, if 
EU integration failed, a relapse into war was feared,76 and interviewees perceived 
attempts by other EU states to leave the EU as being moves towards older, outdated 
systems of governance.77 Important in this was the idea that the EU was the future, and 
one that was moving still at a fast pace that BiH had to keep up with,78 a message that 
was institutionalised and reinforced in EU progress reports79 which in turn gave “advice, 
recommendations and what to do if we want to be, you know, one step closer to the 
European Union”.80 External actors saw this from a different perspective, however, 
suggesting that BiH was somewhat jumping ahead of the process; one EU representative 
stated that BiH “passed police reform to the EU whilst the reform was still in progress”.81 
Integration with both NATO and the EU was highlighted as a move forward for BiH, and 
therefore satisfying their requirements was taken as an allegory for progress,82 and this 
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was frequently mentioned alongside references to peacebuilding and 
democratisation.83 But even where not associated with democratisation, integration 
with regional organisations was explained in a linear fashion.84 Interviewees referring to 
integration also used roads and speed as metaphors, for example mentioning efforts to 
“fast track discussions”85 or discussing “Bosnia’s possible road towards European 
integration and accession”86 and “steps toward EU integration”.87 
Interviewees in BiH pointed to the “common understanding among the political elite 
that EU integration is a good thing” whilst noting that even Republika Srpska, which is a 
majority Serb area of BiH that is heavily influenced by Belgrade with regards to EU 
membership,88 had no issues with BiH’s EU integration “because Serbia is [also] going 
for EU membership”.89 Whatever disagreements there were about the past and the 
present, many of those who disagreed about these matters seemed to agree on the 
priority for the future—EU integration. 
The idea of democracy being something ahead of whatever came before (i.e. that it was 
fit for the present day, and that other governance systems were outdated) was 
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highlighted by a range of interviewees. One interviewee introduced the issue as follows: 
“Part of the overall effort in BiH is to bring the administration, procedures and society 
overall more in-line with what’s expected of a modern democracy, and with the 
regulations that are currently accepted”.90 However, as will be addressed in the next 
section, there was a level of acceptance amongst interviewees of the opinion that some 
were much more capable of processing “newer” or more “complicated” ideas of peace, 
and thus there was a significant intergenerational split in the peacebuilding process. The 
same individuals were also bearing the severe economic consequences of integration.91 
The linear historicity of conflict outlined above places the central conflict that led to the 
peacebuilding intervention as the rupture of progress from which the rebuilding of 
society begins. The future events are then read against this chosen ‘past’. In the case of 
BiH and Cambodia, while the future achievement of a broadly liberal peace is a work in 
progress, it is still in progress. 
The liberal timescape continues to shape understandings of peacebuilding and informs 
policy decisions. This notion of time, pervasive in the narratives and practices of donors 
and civil society representatives, may serve to deflect attention away from current 
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political dynamics. Following Sean McMahon,92 we argue that this liberal timescape, 
which reproduces a belief that peace will come in the future, may thus serve to regulate 
society. As we will see in the next discussion, this timescape operates in opposition to 
the everyday timescapes of subaltern communities and serves to deflect local concerns 
with promises of what is to come. 
 
Intergenerational Time  
The final timescape pertains to the gap that opens up between the experiences of 
generations. The effect of assumptions of linear time with respect to violent conflict is 
that the rupture of war comes to be the dominant narrative, written and understood 
from the perspective of survivors, and it is this history that defines progress and 
peacebuilding initiatives. Conceptions of time within a given generation are inextricably 
linked to perceptions and orientations towards peace. This is of crucial importance to 
emancipatory peacebuilding as it highlights that what constitutes the everyday is 
embedded in particular timescapes, and that distinct generations can have profoundly 
different politics. While there are potential benefits to this separation of experiences, 
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not the least of which is an ebbing of the memory of violence and trauma, this also poses 
potential risks to a sustainable emancipatory peace. In particular, one organisation 
working on this theme stated that this runs the risk of opening-up intergenerational 
conflict as the needs of different portions of society increasingly differ from one 
another.93 
Unsurprisingly, given the dearth of attention to the passage of time on peacebuilding, 
there is presently relatively little academic work available on intergenerational peace.94 
Yet if peacebuilding is treated as a process rather than an outcome then we must accept 
that it remains an ongoing concern that must be continuously redressed by societies. We 
would normally expect this to take place through embedded societal processes, such as 
education and family socialisation, supported by a state that works to redress the needs 
of communities. 
Cambodia is now in a position where the majority of its population has no lived memory 
of the genocide, and where anyone aged 25 or under has grown up after the formal 
cessation of the UN peacebuilding mission. As such, the experiences of different 
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generations vary substantially from one to the next, while the attention of both the state 
and the international community to this inconsistency of experiences is minimal. An 
intergenerational divide has thus emerged in Cambodia. It was stated that there was a 
significant portion of Cambodian society that was willing to simply get on with life, and 
that public interest in peacebuilding was waning. The concern that then arose was that 
there would be less engagement either in identifying sources of potential conflict, or in 
fostering mechanisms for their peaceful resolution. However, it was noted in two 
interviews that the Cambodian youth were upset with the situation,95 and that they did 
not feel well served either by the state or by civil society organisations.96 This, as an 
international consultant in Cambodia argued, highlights the issue of intergenerational 
conflict, and of the potential for future violent conflict if the political and economic 
aspirations of the youth are not met.97 
The need to address intergenerational peace in Cambodia is pressing. One Cambodian 
organisation focuses on intergenerational dialogue between post-war groups who hardly 
believe what happened during the Khmer Rouge era (and afterwards) on the one hand, 
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and the survivors on the other. During an interview with a representative of this 
organisation, it was indicated that a substantial gap had opened-up between the 
experiences and expectations of distinct generations, and that these were hampering 
the possibility of identifying and redressing causes of conflict (and therefore ultimately 
limiting the extent of transitional justice).98 This narrative of distinct priorities across 
generations was further echoed in another interview where the challenge was identified 
as a significant barrier to sustainable peace.99 
The recognition of generational divides highlights how the passage of time opens up 
different demands made by various generations. Here it is crucial to highlight how the 
differing experiences of each generation may result in each operating under a very 
different temporal framework, each of which in turn shapes that generation’s needs and 
expectations around peacebuilding. Generations that directly experience violence may 
ground their interpretations of events in relation to the past, while more recent 
generations may focus more on current affairs or future horizons. As such, the manner 
in which groups experience and react to policies is shaped by their temporal frameworks. 
This intergenerational time is largely ignored by donors and is relatively absent from 
academic analyses of peacebuilding. 
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While the situation in BiH differs substantially from that in Cambodia, the opening-up of 
dramatically different perceptions of the past and future, and of broader socio-political 
processes, was also highlighted by interviewees in BiH. While BiH is in a post-war stage, 
the violence of the 1990s and the lasting impacts of the 1995 Dayton Agreement are part 
of the lived experience of the majority of the population.100 Indeed, discrimination, 
structural violence and ethnically-based politics continue to shape the state. The central 
dilemma highlighted by the interviews there was that young people were seen as the 
catalyst for change, yet were also easily influenced by nationalist politics, likely to be 
un(der)employed, and in many cases wanted to leave the country. 
All of the interviewees in BiH were of an age that meant they would have experienced 
violence within their living memory. These individuals attributed a form of legitimacy to 
the knowledge of those who had lived through violence, while the views of younger 
generations was not granted the same weight: “A lot of young people think conflict just 
happens, but the analysis of war shows that these logical factors contribute to the 
likelihood of it occurring”.101 Many of those same young people, however, were not 
interested in this conflict, or the reasons behind it, as alluded by one interviewee: 
“We’ve got all three sides still existing apart from one another. But politicians aren’t 
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moving on, so this is no surprise. Young and middle-aged people, meanwhile, are leaving 
BiH because they don’t have anyone they can vote for”.102 It was not just this that was 
causing young people to leave: a lack of employment was cited as a key reason for the 
outpouring of young people from BiH to other countries. One interviewee said: 
We are a very much undeveloped country. Maybe not undeveloped in terms of 
industrialisation, but having over 40% of unemployed people, and mainly young 
generations, without security and stability we cannot expect investment. And 
this is what I see as the key issue.103 
Another interviewee noted that the lack of capacity in BiH related to the fact that “all of 
the young people who are well-spoken and well-educated are trying to leave the 
country”.104 No matter how much training was available for the younger generation, 
ultimately without employment, there was no sustainable future for them in BiH. One 
interview put this simply: 
you can have thousands of workshops, stories, promotions, but if no one has a 
chance to get a decent job and afford an apartment, house or piece of land, some 
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prospect for 20 to 30 years for himself or herself, and for the next generation, 
then nobody is coming back to live and work here.105  
Although one firm in Sarajevo had actively hired ten well-educated young people in 
response to this problem, this move did not address the overall lack of capacity, and the 
same interviewee, who was also from BiH, noted that when speaking to these ten 
employees, “It felt like we were speaking to the only ten competent, intelligent young 
people in BiH”.106 
What was argued to be particularly problematic was that, while the youth could not 
remember the war, they were nevertheless segregated: “We have new generations who 
don’t remember war, but we have segregation in schools which is still causing the same 
problem”.107 Similarly, another interviewee suggested: 
I think if you’re able to produce relatively strong platforms including for those 
who are disadvantaged and marginalised and stationary, so that they can begin 
to engage with policy, that is a good start to a generational conflict resolution 
mechanism.108 
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But these efforts were not forthcoming. And as one interviewee explained, “the training 
of young democrats is great, but if you recognise that social democratic parties are the 
same ones that cause corruption and gridlocks, you can see there are still issues to 
resolve.109 
Because elite politicians have had significant control over BiH’s political environment, 
their collective role in influencing the population has been important. One interviewee 
highlighted the intergenerational aspect of this: “Since the end of the war we’ve seen 
the level of nationalism and ethnic hatred is even higher than it was compared to 10 
years ago. We have young people who’ve grown up in their own communities not 
knowing about their neighbours”.110 This left them particularly at risk of being influenced 
by chauvinist politicians. Interviewees highlighted “constant abuse by leading politicians 
of past conflicts by keeping them alive, stirring-up these past conflicts”, which served to 
undermine capacity building efforts.111 This meant that even those born in the mid to 
late 1990s, who would not have any clear memory of war-fighting and who are today in 
their early 20s, were being encouraged to embrace divisive nationalist ideals. The result 
of this was therefore also the ethnic polarisation of politics within BiH, to the point where 
“the liberal people are leaving the country… [leaving behind] only those who are okay 
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with ethnic division”.112 As such, the population, too, was becoming increasingly 
interested in speaking to politicians about ethnic issues.113 Members of the youth who 
were more liberal were, unsurprisingly, further encouraged by this polarisation to leave 
the country.114 
Meanwhile, multi-ethnic political parties in BiH did not command enough political 
support amongst the electorate to stand a chance of governing.115 The prospect of EU 
accession unified the views of some, and the youth vote was perceived to be vital for this 
aspiration to be realised: 
What is problematic with this is that we are still divided on issues like the EU. The 
opinions of new generations are very important for the EU accession. So, it’s good 
to get events organised with students, bringing in experts on the rule of law and 
so on.116 
Again, the idea of the younger generation being a facilitator of peace was salient here, 
and was reflected in the idea that the focus of educational and capacity building 
initiatives (particularly those related to European integration) should be focused on 
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young politicians from all political parties,117 and that young people should be 
encouraged to attend donor and civil society networking events.118 This idea that the 
younger generation was a cohort of change-makers was echoed by another interviewee 
who referred to having “the pleasure of working with younger, sharper, more technically 
savvy Bosnians. We’ve mentored them in order to assist them in making their country 
better”.119 
None of this is to suggest that young people in BiH did not contribute to peacebuilding. 
Youth organisations were instrumental in peacebuilding efforts including through youth 
courts dealing with transitional justice and via youth initiatives addressing hate 
speech.120 However, where youth organisations were involved in peace programmes, 
their contributions were at times stunted by international influence: “We work with 
some youth organisations, too. But most of the problem is that these programmes are 
externally-driven, so you don’t have any peacebuilding programmes that are locally 
owned in BiH”.121 Domestically, too, young people faced challenges with legitimacy 
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amongst older generations, while young people’s issues were frequently handled by 
those same older generations: 
The result of [one recent] approach [to including young people in peacebuilding] 
was that the panels [they organised] talking about youth issues were all 
composed entirely of males aged 40 and over. Why not have people from the 
community? This is why grassroots organisations are vitally important—you 
could get those representatives’ views instead. When you raise these points with 
people, they are, to be fair, quite open to changing their opinions. At 30 years of 
age, however, I’m not considered wise enough, especially because I look young 
and care about [young] people’s issues.122 
The same interviewee elaborated: “If you’re not an old man in this sector, it’s very 
difficult to enter the conversation and not be ‘mansplained’ to. I am obviously a man, 
but I’m young, so even I’m vulnerable to it”.123 This demonstrates the ways in which the 
experiences of time, and the ways in which time privileges particular generations, 
reproduces one narrative of history at the expense of others. Time has the effect of 
limiting the practice of politics and silencing younger generations. The concern, 
expressed within both BiH and Cambodia, is that this can both open-up new cleavages 
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within society with the potential of a return to violence, and simultaneously depoliticise 
those excluded from public debate, thus removing crucial voices from political discourse 
and potentially delegimitising the state in the eyes of future generations. 
 
Conclusion 
In integrating an attention to time into the analysis of peacebuilding, this article has 
highlighted the ways in which the goals of an emancipatory peace that privileges the 
local and politics of the everyday are not being well-served by current practices. Working 
within this broad framework, we have then sought to identify how representatives of 
civil society organisations articulate the barriers to peacebuilding that have a time 
component. A clear disconnect is apparent between on the one hand the identified 
longitudinal issues that impact upon the sustainability of peacebuilding measures, and 
on the other hand the policies of the donor community that support and enable formal 
civil society organisations’ engagement with peacebuilding. This represents a significant 
shortcoming in current peacebuilding policies that will have far-reaching implications 
beyond the specific cases of BiH and Cambodia that we have focused upon in this article. 
In both of the empirical cases studied during the process of writing this article, the 
interviewees consistently raised issues of time in various ways in describing what they 
saw as limitations or impediments to localisation. In some instances, particularly in 
relation to funding structures, this was couched within critiques of a lack of long-term 
vision on the part of international actors and donors. An attenuation to temporality 
highlights that such policy shortcomings are not simply a question of a failure of 
imagination on the part of donors, but that there is a deeper logic that informs such 
actions. In this respect, simply extending or shifting the time horizons of policymakers is 
unlikely to be sufficient. While this might address some issues related to the 
sustainability of funding, it is unlikely to break down the disparate timescapes between 
donors and local actors. Likewise, the liberal timescape emphasises the ways in which 
the temporal logics of international actors, inherent in liberalism, shape understandings 
of the nature of conflict and peace, favouring statist timeframes which further 
marginalise and exclude the everyday in both BiH and Cambodia. It is the 
intergenerational timescape that focuses attention on how we need to recognise that a 
foregrounding of the everyday demands that we focus on the distinct timescapes of 
different generations in order to see how this can open-up very different political 
demands. The privileging of the historical experiences of particular generations occludes 
and perhaps ignores emerging concerns. As the comparison between BiH and Cambodia 
illustrates, post-war generations, with their distinct historical frames, cannot be simply 
understood from the perspective(s) of their elders’ or their states’ timescapes.  
By focusing narrowly on the impact of temporal politics on localisation through NGOs, 
this article has highlighted that the under-explored features of timescapes emphasise 
how the impediments to peacebuilding are more complex than would be suggested by 
traditional tropes to the effect that policies need to take a ‘long-term’ view. In this article 
we have also emphasised the need to better integrate the experiences of locals. This 
pushes us beyond John Cockell’s arguments that “[s]ustainable peace can only be 
founded on the indigenous, societal resources for intergroup dialogue, cooperation and 
consensus”.124 Rather, we assert that to achieve such ends, it is essential to create a 
disruption that draws attention to how privileged timescapes associated with states and 
the international community obscure local chronopolitics (and how communities can 
themselves have multiple, disparate timescapes). 
In assessing the impacts of the passage of time on peacebuilding endeavours, we have 
identified three timescapes articulated by civil society representatives. The first, Policy 
Time, serves to illustrate how timeframes inform and limit policymaking. While the 
impact of short-termism seen in the erosion of long-term capacities in peacebuilding is 
well-recognised, if we foreground the temporal logics, we are forced to confront how 
the resulting NGO activities can run counter to everyday experiences of communities 
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and their own temporalities. This implies that simply adjusting policymaking to enable 
longer-term projects is insufficient to redress the underlying logics that serve to privilege 
policy time over local time. This has important implications for policy recommendations 
as it reveals the inherit limits in seeking to change the project timelines and suggests a 
need for much more radical changes to be made to the funding of project work. Simply 
extending funding horizons or resequencing reporting requirements cannot redress the 
disjuncture between donors, projects and communities. Rather, we suggest funding that 
mechanisms need to be identified and enacted that reconnect those mechanisms to local 
timescapes, which means being removed from the regulative requirements of donors, 
and making a shift to open-ended funding. 
The second area, Liberal Political Time, highlights the ways in which liberal temporality 
affects how peacebuilding projects, and broader development initiatives, continue to be 
implemented. Deeply embedded assumptions about progress frame the policy decisions 
of states and international actors. This teleology then situates the narratives of 
development and ‘progress’ in such a way that means that deviations from expected 
norms continue to be seen as ‘reversals’ and ‘slippages’ from liberal ideals, despite the 
appreciation of hybridity. As with Policy Time, this timescape operates in a manner that 
privileges Western states and international actors, while occluding how local political 
timescapes may result in very different political needs. Without an appreciation of this 
potential – and this is reflected in the decline of available funding with a deliberate 
peacebuilding framing – the ability to build a sustainable peace that meets the needs of 
marginalised communities can be eroded. This is further enacted by the manner in which 
the statist linear rendering of time privileges the development states and their elites who 
leverage liberal chronopolitics to entrench authority. This is exacerbated in situations 
where economic growth and the availability of alternative sources of international 
assistance decrease the pressure on entrenched authorities to nominally protect civil 
society actors and subaltern groups.  
The final timescape, Intergenerational Time, highlights how the requirements of distinct 
generations can deviate from one another, how programmes designed for one 
generation may therefore have little relevance to the next and, importantly, how 
intergenerational divides may ultimately erode positive peace. As Ian Klinke notes, 
“collective identities are produced as much through temporal boundaries as they are 
through spatial ones”.125 While this emphasises the ways in which the timeframes of 
distinct generations can open-up substantially different understandings and needs 
related to peacebuilding, it also points to the requirement to foreground temporality in 
our understandings of the ‘everyday’. 
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This article started from a position that asserts that achieving a sustainable emancipatory 
peace requires peacebuilding activities to be locally sensitive, responding to the needs 
emanating from communities, rather than to the imposition of priorities and solutions 
from outside. This, however, is not simply about replacing one chronopolitics with 
another. Instead it is essential to appreciate synchronicity, and how conceptions and 
experiences of time are complex, overlapping and contradicting one another, as well as 
how this serves to regulate what is seen as possible and which positions are privileged. 
Peacebuilding must be more attuned to the ways in which the passage of time can open-
up radically different perceptions of political dynamics between groups and between 
generations. Time’s passage draws attention to these differences and can fundamentally 
alter or (re)enforce power dynamics within states. To be effective and sustainable, 
peacebuilding must respond to these dynamics and ensure that intergenerational 
differences are appreciated and accounted for in peacebuilding initiatives. 
A critical attention to chronopolitics within peacebuilding provides a crucial and under-
explored understanding of how distinct timescapes potentially work against achieving 
an emancipatory peace. This attention to time should not be taken as depoliticising. 
Rather, in revealing the countervailing logics of time, and doing so in a way that seeks to 
emphasise the chronopolitics of the local everyday(s), we are better placed to work 
toward local empowerment in peacebuilding. 
This article derived from an analysis of the narratives of time imparted by 
representatives of local and international NGOs, think tanks, donor organisations, the EU 
and other international institutions, as well as academics and embassy personnel. We 
have suggested in our analysis that these accounts collectively point to the existence of 
disparate timescapes within local communities that run up against the distinct linear 
timescapes of policymaking and liberalism. Further research is required to explore the 
local timescapes in post-war settings, and this research should pay far greater attention 
not just to intergenerational divides, but also to exploring how cultures and gender, for 
example, further shape and are shaped by timescapes that in turn impact upon the 
politics of the everyday. 
 
Annex: List of interviews 
Numbered list of interviews – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Interview No. Organisation Type Location Date 
Interview BH01 Military Sarajevo, BiH 02/10/2017 
Interview BH02 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 03/10/2017 
Interview BH03 International NGO Sarajevo, BiH 04/10/2017 
Interview BH04 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 05/10/2017 
Interview BH05 Think tank Sarajevo, BiH 09/10/2017 
Interview BH06 International NGO Sarajevo, BiH 09/10/2017 
Interview BH07 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 09/10/2017 
Interview BH08 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 26/10/2017 
Interview BH09 International organisation Via Skype 09/11/2017 
Interview BH10 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 01/11/2016 
Interview BH11 Military Sarajevo, BiH 01/11/2016 
Interview BH12 Military Sarajevo, BiH 03/11/2016 
Interview BH13 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 03/11/2016 
Interview BH14 Academic Sarajevo, BiH 03/11/2016 
Interview BH15 Regional NGO Sarajevo, BiH 07/11/2016 
Interview BH16 Diplomat Sarajevo, BiH 08/11/2016 
Interview BH17 Embassy Sarajevo, BiH 09/11/2016 
Interview BH18 International organisation Sarajevo, BiH 09/11/2016 
Interview BH19 Civil servant Sarajevo, BiH 09/11/2016 
Interview BH20 Civil servant Sarajevo, BiH 10/11/2016 
Interview BH21 Independent consultant Via Skype 10/11/2016 
Interview BH22 Academic Sarajevo, BiH 11/11/2016 
Interview BH23 Military Sarajevo, BiH 11/11/2016 
Interview BH24 Local NGO Mostar, BiH 14/11/2016 
Interview BH25 Think tank Via Skype 15/11/2016 
Interview BH26 Think tank Via Skype 21/11/2016 
Interview BH27 Police Via Skype 24/11/2016 
 
Numbered list of interviews – Cambodia 
Interview No. Organisation Type Location Date 
Interview CA01 International NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 11/09/2017 
Interview CA02 International NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 12/09/2017 
Interview CA03 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 12/09/2017 
Interview CA04 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 13/09/2017 
Interview CA05 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 13/09/2017 
Interview CA06 International consultant Phnom Penh, Cambodia 14/09/2017 
Interview CA07 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 14/09/2017 
Interview CA08 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 15/09/2017 
Interview CA09 International NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 15/09/2017 
Interview CA10 Local NGO Phnom Penh, Cambodia 16/09/2017 
 
